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THE PRIVACY RISKS OF DIRECT-TO-
CONSUMER GENETIC TESTING:  
A CASE STUDY OF 23ANDME AND ANCESTRY 
SAMUAL A. GARNER AND JIYEON KIM* 
ABSTRACT 
Direct-to-consumer genetic testing (DTC-GT) companies have 
proliferated and expanded in recent years. Using biospecimens directly 
submitted by consumers, these companies sequence and analyze the 
individual’s genetic information to provide a wide range of services 
including information on health and ancestry without the guidance of a 
healthcare provider. Given the sensitive nature of genetic information, 
however, there are growing privacy concerns regarding DTC-GT company 
data practices. We conduct a rigorous analysis, both descriptive and 
normative, of the privacy policies and associated privacy risks and harms 
of the DTC-GT services of two major companies, 23andMe and Ancestry, 
and evaluate to what extent consumers’ genetic privacy is protected by the 
policies and practices of these two companies. Despite the exceptional 
nature of genetic information, the laws and agency regulation surrounding 
genetic privacy and DTC-GT services are fragmented and insufficient. In 
this analysis, we propose three categories of privacy harms specific to DTC-
GT—knowledge harms, autonomy and trust-based harms, and data misuse 
harms. Then, through the normative lens of exploitation, we argue that 
23andMe and Ancestry’s data practices and privacy policies provide 
consumers with insufficient protection against these harms. Greater efforts 
from both the industry and legal system are necessary to protect DTC-GT 
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The rapid advances in sequencing technology and genomics have fueled 
the expansion of the Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing (DTC-GT) 
industry. According to industry estimates, over 12 million people had used 
DTC-GT services by 2017,1 and the global DTC-GT market was valued at 
$359 million in 2017.2 Recent years have been particularly exciting for the 
 
1. Ancestry.com has tested more than seven million people, followed by 23andMe, which has 
tested over three million people. Antonio Regalado, 2017 Was the Year Consumer DNA Testing Blew 
Up, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610233/2017-was-the-
year-consume r-dna-testing-blew-up/ [https://perma.cc/EH4Z-6N5A].  
2. Global $928 Million Consumer DNA (Genetic) Testing Market 2018–2023 with 23andMe, 















industry as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) authorized 23andMe, 
a leading DTC-GT company, to sell the first DTC test for Bloom Syndrome 
in 20153 and, more recently in April 2017, approved 23andMe’s Health 
Predisposition tests, known as genetic heath risk (GHR) tests under FDA 
regulations, for ten diseases.4 FDA is continuing its pro-DTC-GT stance by 
announcing plans to exempt DTC GHR tests from premarket review5 and 
authorizing 23andMe’s GHR test for three BRCA breast cancer gene 
mutations in March 2018 6  and a test for hereditary colorectal cancer 
syndrome in January 2019.7 Advertisements for DTC-GT are omnipresent,8 
and Ancestry, another popular DTC-GT company, has partnered with the 
music streaming service Spotify claiming to offer music tailored to one’s 
DNA.9 
However, given the sensitive nature of data collected and used, DTC-GT 
companies have not been free from privacy concerns. For example, in July 
2018, 23andMe announced that GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), a large 
pharmaceutical company, acquired a $300 million stake in the company 
thereby allowing GSK to use 23andMe consumers’ genetic information for 
drug discovery.10 The recent arrest of the suspected Golden State Killer 
 
3. Letter from Courtney H. Lias, Dir., Div. of Chemistry & Toxicology Devices, Office of In 
Vitro Diagnostics & Radiological Health, Ctr. for Devices & Radiological Health, U.S. Food & Drug 
Admin., to Kathy Hibbs, Chief Legal & Regulatory Officer, 23andMe, Inc. (Oct. 1, 2015), https://www.a 
ccessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf14/den140044.pdf [https://perma.cc/9B95-ZLKM]. 
4. FDA Allows Marketing of First Direct-to-Consumer Tests that Provide Genetic Risk 
Information for Certain Conditions, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (April 6, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/ 
NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm551185.htm [https://perma.cc/D78P-R5VE]. 
5. Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 
6, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm583885.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/3GUG-MEW6]. 
6. FDA Authorizes, with Special Controls, Direct-to-Consumer Test that Reports Three 
Mutations in the BRCA Breast Cancer Genes, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www. 
fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannouncements/ucm599560.htm [https://perma.cc/P9F5-VU33].  
7. 23andMe Receives FDA Clearance for Genetic Health Risk Report that Looks at a 
Hereditary Colorectal Cancer Syndrome, 23ANDME (Jan. 22, 2019), https://blog.23andme.com/health-
traits/23andme-receives-fda-clearance-for-genetic-health-risk-report-that-looks-at-a-hereditary-colorec 
tal-cancer-syndrome/ [https://perma.cc/TW82-PB92].  
8. See, e.g., Catherine Ho, DNA Testing Companies Get into the Black Friday Game, S.F. 
CHRON. (Nov. 23, 2018, 4:00 AM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/DNA-testing-compan 
ies-get-into-the-Black-Friday-13415212.php [https://perma.cc/8Z94-Q2MP].  
9. Listen on Spotify, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/cs/spotify [https://perma.cc/2LA8-
ASUV]. The service launched on September 21, 2018, and more than 10,000 people signed up within 
one day. Aisha Hassan, Spotify and Ancestry Can Use Your Real DNA to Tell Your “Musical DNA,” 
QUARTZY (Sept. 22, 2018), https://qz.com/quartzy/1399279/spotify-can-use-your-ancestry-dna-test-to-
tell-your-musical-dna/ [https://perma.cc/7N5K-WVKC].  
10. Jamie Ducharme, A Major Drug Company Now Has Access to 23andMe’s Genetic Data. 
Should You Be Concerned?, TIME (July 26, 2018), http://time.com/5349896/23andme-glaxo-smith-klin 
e/ [https://perma.cc/BU23-DE6S].  











using DNA evidence from a public database brings additional scrutiny to 
DTC-GT services.11  
Worries about genetic privacy, while not new, are one part of the 
growing concerns over health information privacy as the collection of non-
traditional medical information grows. For example, an increasingly large 
number of devices, such as the Apple Watch or One Drop’s Bluetooth 
Glucose Meter, 12  collect an individual’s medical information, from 
electrocardiogram (ECG) to blood sugar levels, and send it to private 
companies.13 The concern over genetic privacy is also a part of the “privacy 
crisis” our society seems to be facing. Almost every month, we seem to be 
hearing about another large data breach or the alarming data practices of 
major technology companies concerning user data.14  
However, some of our most private and essential information is in the 
possession of DTC-GT companies, which are subject to an inadequate 
patchwork of laws.15 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA)16, for example, does not have jurisdiction to regulate medical 
information outside of the traditional healthcare context, and traditional 
federal agency regulation appears inadequate. 17  And, among medical 
information, genetic information may be particularly sensitive because it is 
immutable and uniquely identifiable.18 Genetic information, because it is 
hereditary, may also implicate genetically related family members, as well 
as a racial or ethnic group.  
Meanwhile, the existing legal scholarship on genetic privacy and DTC-
GT companies has largely been surveys of companies’ privacy policies and 
guidelines. Some studies have either provided an overview of the problems 
posed by the DTC-GT services 19  or consumer understanding of the 
 
11. See, e.g., Thomas May, Sociogenetic Risks—Ancestry DNA Testing, Third-Party Identity, 
and Protection of Privacy, 379 NEW ENG. J. MED. 410, 410 (2018), https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.10 
56/NEJMp1805870. 
12. Glucose Meter, ONE DROP, https://onedrop.today/products/glucose-meter [https://perma.cc/ 
R2YX-SUHL]. 
13. Alex Fitzpatrick, An Inside Look at Apple’s Biggest Step Yet in Health Care, TIME (Dec. 6, 
2018), http://time.com/5472329/apple-watch-ecg/ [https://perma.cc/463P-YEJ4].  
14. Woodrow Hartzog & Neil Richards, It’s Time to Try Something Different on Internet 
Privacy, WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/its-time-to-try-somet 
hing-different-on-internet-privacy/2018/12/20/bc1d71c0-0315-11e9-9122-82e98f91ee6f_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q4JD-VWE3].  
15. See infra Part I. 
16. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 
1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
17. See infra Part I. 
18. See infra Part III.A. 
19. See, e.g., Andelka M. Phillips, Only a Click Away—DTC Genetics for Ancestry, Health, 
Love… and More: A View of the Business and Regulatory Landscape, 8 APPLIED & TRANSLATIONAL 
GENOMICS 16 (2016); Sivan Tamir, Direct-To-Consumer Genetic Testing: Ethical-Legal Perspectives 












companies’ privacy policies.20 One study conducted a framework analysis 
on thirty DTC-GT companies’ privacy policies and practices using a 
“codebook” developed by synthesizing guidelines from professional 
societies and public bodies,21 and another recent paper used the FTC’s Fair 
Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) as a baseline framework to evaluate 
the privacy policies of ninety DTC-GT companies.22 While instructive, the 
survey studies have remained largely descriptive. In addition, although there 
have been concerns about the risks of DTC-GT—the validity and utility of 
the tests, inappropriate healthcare decisions, emotional harm, data 
security—since the advent of DTC-GT, 23  a focused and rigorous legal 
analysis of particular DTC-GT company practices has been wanting.  
This Article contributes by being the first to conduct a rigorous analysis, 
both descriptive and normative, of the privacy policies and associated 
privacy risks of the DTC-GT services of two major companies—23andMe 
and Ancestry (focusing on AncestryDNA)—and evaluates to what extent 
consumers’ genetic privacy is protected by the policies and practices of 
these two companies. The reason we focus on these two companies is that 
23andMe and Ancestry are industry leaders. As industry leaders, they can 
set the industry standard and lead the industry for better data practices and 
privacy protection.  
Our analysis is structured into five parts. Part I provides an overview of 
the current legal landscape in the United States surrounding DTC-GT 
companies and their consumers, including federal laws and agencies, state 
law, and common law. We address that while there are many laws and 
agencies that appear to govern the DTC-GT industry, they do so in a 
piecemeal and incomplete manner. As a consequence, consumers’ genetic 
privacy is left particularly vulnerable. This work focuses on the practices of 
23andMe and Ancestry, and, thus, Part II will briefly review the services 
provided by these two companies. Part III introduces exploitation theory as 
 
20. See, e.g., Emily Christofides & Kieran O’Doherty, Company Disclosure and Consumer 
Perceptions of the Privacy Implications of Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing, 35 NEW GENETICS & 
SOC’Y 101 (2016). 
21. Linnea I. Laestadius et al., All Your Data (Effectively) Belong to Us: Data Practices Among 
Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Firms, 19 GENETICS. MED. 513, 514 (2017). 
22. James W. Hazel & Christopher Slobogin, Who Knows What, and When?: A Survey of the 
Privacy Policies Proffered by U.S. Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Companies, 28 CORNELL J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 35, 35 (2018). 
23. See, e.g., Stuart Hogarth et al., The Current Landscape for Direct-to-Consumer Genetic 
Testing: Legal, Ethical, and Policy Issues, 9 ANN. REV. GENOMICS & HUM. GENETICS 161 (2008); Heidi 
C. Howard, Bartha Maria Knoppers & Pascal Borry, Blurring Lines: The Research Activities of Direct-
to-Consumer Genetic Testing Companies Raise Questions About Consumers as Research Subjects, 11 
EMBO REP. 579 (2010); Emilia Niemiec & Heidi C. Howard, Ethical Issues in Consumer Genome 
Sequencing: Use of Consumers’ Samples and Data, 8 APPLIED & TRANSLATIONAL GENOMICS 23 
(2016); J. Scott Roberts & Jenny Ostergren, Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing and Personal 
Genomics Services: A Review of Recent Empirical Studies, 1 CURRENT GENETIC MED. REP. 182 (2013). 











the guiding normative framework, which requires consideration of the 
distribution of benefits and risks in a transaction. We break risk into a three-
part analysis, including defining the type of harm, the magnitude of that 
harm, and the probability that the harm will materialize.24 We propose three 
categories of harms that most helpfully capture the potential privacy harms 
of DTC-GT: (1) knowledge harms; (2) autonomy and trust-based harms, 
which include worries about notice, choice, and deception; and (3) the 
harms related to data misuse. We further argue that the risks associated with 
genetic information are heightened relative to other consumer or even health 
data because of the special nature of genetic information, supporting the 
notion of genetic exceptionalism. Part IV will assess to what extent these 
companies adequately protect against the privacy risks discussed in Part III 
through a combination of their consent, privacy policies, and data 
management practices. We conclude in Part V by examining how the DTC-
GT consumers’ genetic privacy can be better protected by valuing trust, 
more stringent agency oversight, and potentially comprehensive data 
privacy legislation.  
I. REGULATION OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER GENETIC TESTING 
In the United States, a number of laws and agencies have jurisdiction to 
regulate genetic information or govern the DTC-GT industry. However, the 
regulation is fragmented and incomplete.25 Genetic privacy of DTC-GT 
consumers can be protected in two ways: directly by regulating the 
collection, processing, use, and/or storage of genetic information; or 
indirectly by regulating the DTC-GT companies themselves. This Part 
examines the legal landscape surrounding the DTC-GT industry by 
categorizing the relevant laws and agencies into four groups and analyzing 
whether they are effective in regulating DTC-GT companies and/or genetic 
information produced by those companies: (1) federal laws that can regulate 
genetic information; (2) federal agencies that can regulate DTC-GT 
companies; (3) state laws that supplement the federal laws and agencies; 





24. Annette Rid et al., Evaluating the Risks of Clinical Research, 304 JAMA 1472, 1472 (2010). 
25. For broader discussion on the piecemeal manner of privacy regulation in the U.S., see 
generally Kirsty Hughes & Neil M. Richards, The Atlantic Divide on Privacy and Free Speech, in 












A. Federal Laws That Can Regulate Genetic Information 
Privacy law in the United States is fragmented with different laws 
regulating different sectors and industries. 26  The Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)27 provides the baseline privacy 
and data security rules for the healthcare industry. HIPAA’s Privacy Rule28 
regulates the use and disclosure of individuals’ “protected health 
information” by a “covered entity or business associate.”29 Under HIPAA, 
health information includes genetic information, 30  which encompasses 
information from genetic tests of an individual or family members or the 
manifestation of a disease in family members.31 Genetic information from 
DTC-GT, however, is health information that lies beyond HIPAA’s 
jurisdiction.32 HIPAA defines “covered entities” as a health plan, health 
care clearinghouse, or health care provider33 and “business associate” as a 
person or organization that performs certain functions or activities on behalf 
of or provides certain services for a covered entity involving protected 
health information. 34  As DTC-GT companies do not qualify as such 
“covered entities” or “business associates” under HIPAA, DTC-GT 
 
26. See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 587 (2014) (“[I]t is fair to say that U.S. privacy law regulates only specific 
types of data when collected and used by specific types of entities.”) In contrast, the European Union 
(EU) General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) protects privacy broadly by regulating the processing 
of “personal data” defined as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person.” 
Regulation 2016/679, art. 4(1), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 33. The Privacy Act of 1974 seeks to protect privacy 
generally, yet only covers personal information that is maintained in systems of records by federal 
agencies. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2018). 
27. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 
1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
28. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2018).  
29. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2018). 
30. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2018). 
31. The full text of the provision is as follows: 
Genetic information means:  
. . . information about:  
(i) The individual’s genetic tests;  
(ii) The genetic tests of family members of the individual;  
(iii) The manifestation of a disease or disorder in family members of such individual; or  
(iv) Any request for, or receipt of, genetic services, or participation in clinical research which 
includes genetic services, by the individual or any family member of the individual. 
Id.  
32. For discussion on growing issues regarding health information “beyond HIPAA,” see U.S. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH INFORMATION PRIVACY BEYOND HIPAA: A 2018 
ENVIRONMENTAL SCAN OF MAJOR TRENDS AND CHALLENGES (Dec. 13, 2017), https://ncvhs.hhs.gov/w 
p-content/uploads/2018/05/NCVHS-Beyond-HIPAA_Report-Final-02-08-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/WG 
6M-R27U]. 
33. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. 
34. Id. 











consumers’ genetic privacy is unlikely to be protected by HIPAA’s Privacy 
Rule.35  
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) 36  and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 37  are federal laws that have 
jurisdiction to regulate the use of genetic information in certain contexts and 
remedy certain forms of discrimination. GINA was enacted in 2008 “to fully 
protect the public from [genetic] discrimination and allay their concerns 
about the potential for discrimination, thereby allowing individuals to take 
advantage of genetic testing, technologies, research, and new therapies.”38 
Title I of GINA prohibits discrimination based on genetic information by 
health insurers, and Title II prohibits discrimination in employment based 
on genetic information. Under GINA, genetic information is defined as 
information from genetic tests of an individual or family members or the 
manifestation of a disease in family members and includes information from 
genetic services or genetic research.39 Therefore, genetic information from 
DTC-GT falls under GINA’s jurisdiction. Such information is treated as a 
“confidential medical record” 40  under GINA, and an employer is also 
prohibited from disclosing an individual’s genetic information41 or from 
requesting, requiring, or purchasing genetic information 42  except in a 
 
35. An exception would be when a DTC-GT company partners with a covered entity and 
qualifies as a business associate under HIPAA. For example, in 2009, 23andMe announced its 
partnership with Palomar Pomerado Health (PPH), a health care district in California. Under such 
circumstances, PPH members’ genetic information generated by 23andMe would be subject to HIPAA’s 
Privacy Rule. 23andMe and Palomar Pomerado Health Partner to Give PPH Members Access to Their 
Genetic Information, 23ANDME (Apr. 27, 2009), https://mediacenter.23andme.com/press-releases/23 
andme-and-palomar-pomerado-health-partner-to-give-pph-members-access-to-their-genetic-informatio 
n/ [https://perma.cc/MT7K-ERRQ].  
36. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff). 
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2018). 
38. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act § 2(5), 122 Stat. at 881–82. 
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(4). 
(A) In general 
The term “genetic information” means, with respect to any individual, information about— 
(i) such individual’s genetic tests, 
(ii) the genetic tests of family members of such individual, and 
(iii) the manifestation of a disease or disorder in family members of such individual. 
(B) Inclusion of genetic services and participation in genetic research 
Such term includes, with respect to any individual, any request for, or receipt of, genetic 
services, or participation in clinical research which includes genetic services, by such 
individual or any family member of such individual. 
(C) Exclusions 
The term “genetic information” shall not include information about the sex or age of any 
individual. 
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-5(a). 
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-5(b). 












number of defined exceptions. 43  Since 2010, the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has received over 200 charges every year 
filed under GINA,44 and in the first GINA case to go to trial,45 an employer 
was faced with a $2.25 million verdict for violation of GINA.46 Despite such 
enforcement to protect against genetic discrimination, GINA only applies 
to discrimination in the employment and health insurance contexts and does 
not apply to life insurance or long-term care insurance or other potential 
discriminatory uses of genetic information.47  
The ADA prohibits discrimination based on disability in employment, 
public services, public accommodations, and communications.48 While the 
statutory provisions of ADA do not make a reference to genetic traits or 
diseases, the EEOC issued an interpretation in 1995 stating that ADA 
applies to “discrimination on the basis of genetic information relating to 
illness, disease, or other disorders.”49 However, the analysis has since been 
superseded by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 50  and the ADA 
Amendments Act does not address genetic discrimination. In addition, there 
have been no judicial interpretations on whether ADA applies to 
discrimination based on genetic information. Thus, it is unclear whether 
ADA can provide an additional layer of protection from discrimination 
based on genetic information from a DTC-GT company. Moreover, even if 
EEOC provides guidance on the issue, ADA and GINA are still confined to 
prohibiting the use of genetic information in discrimination and do not have 
 
43. Id. The employment provisions have inspired a recent work to propose GINA as a blueprint 
for employee-privacy protection in the big data era. Bradley A. Areheart & Jessica L. Roberts, GINA, 
Big Data, and the Future of Employee Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 710, 764–779 (2019).  
44. Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act Charges, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/genetic.cfm [https://perma.cc/DFX3-9HD 
L]. 
45. Lowe v. Atlas Logistics Grp. Retail Servs., 102 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 1361 (N.D. Ga. 2015) 
(finding that the employer violated GINA when it conducted genetic testing of two employees to identify 
the culprit of defecation episodes in its grocery distribution warehouse).  
46. Natasha Gilbert, Why the ‘Devious Defecator’ Case Is a Landmark for US Genetic-Privacy 
Law, NATURE: NEWS & COMMENT (June 25 2015), https://www.nature.com/news/why-the-devious-def 
ecator-case-is-a-landmark-for-us-genetic-privacy-law-1.17857 [https://perma.cc/28U8-88XT].  
47. See Mark A. Rothstein, GINA, the ADA, and Genetic Discrimination in Employment, 36 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 837, 837–38 (2008) (discussing deficiencies of GINA including its limited reach, 
application based on genotype but not phenotype, and a loophole related to ADA). 
48. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2018). 
49. AMANDA K. SARATA & JODY FEDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34584, THE GENETIC 
INFORMATION NONDISCRIMINATION ACT OF 2008 (GINA) 6 (2015) (quoting U.S. EQUAL EMP’T. 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 2 COMPLIANCE MANUAL 902, 915.002 (1995)), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL 
34584.pdf [https://perma.cc/WCA6-MRMB]. 
50. Section 902 Definition of the Term Disability, EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/902cm.html [https://perma.cc/6E7M-Q9N3] (last modified July 25, 
2012); see also ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 12101). 











the jurisdiction to protect the DTC-GT consumers’ genetic information in 
other contexts.  
B. Federal Administrative Agencies That Can Regulate DTC-GT 
Companies 
Three federal administrative agencies primarily regulate the DTC-GT 
industry: the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) via the Clinical Laboratory 
Improvements Act (CLIA),51 and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). 
FDA protects “the public health by assuring the safety, effectiveness, 
quality, and security of . . . drugs, vaccines and other biological products, 
and medical devices.” 52  FDA has jurisdiction to regulate DTC-GTs as 
medical devices under the Federal Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics Act. 53 
Specifically, FDA considers genetic tests as “in vitro diagnostic” devices, 
which are devices “intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other 
conditions . . . [and] intended for use in the collection, preparation, and 
examination of specimens taken from the human body.”54 Following an 
initial period of enforcement discretion, 55  FDA started to exercise its 
regulatory authority over the DTC-GT industry in 2010 by sending twenty-
three Untitled Letters to DTC-GT companies56 and, in 2013, sent a Warning 
Letter to 23andMe57  which resulted in the company ceasing its sale of 
 
51. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-578, 102 Stat. 2903 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 201, 263a). 
52. FDA Fundamentals, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/transparenc 
y/basics/ucm192695.htm [https://perma.cc/TS47-8DTP].  
53. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2018) (defining a device to include “an instrument, apparatus, 
implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article, including 
any component, part, or accessory, which is . . . intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other 
conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease”). 
54. 21 C.F.R. § 809.3(a) (2018). 
55. See Kayte Spector-Bagdady & Elizabeth R. Pike, Consuming Genomics: Regulating Direct-
to-Consumer Genetic and Genomic Information, 92 NEB. L. REV. 677, 703 (2014).  
56. See, e.g., Letter from James Woods, Deputy Dir., Ctr. for Devices & Radiological Health, 
U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to James Plante, Founder & Chief Exec. Officer, Pathway Genomics Corp. 
(May 10, 2010), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/ResourcesforYou/Industry/UCM211 
875.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZWG-MKGE]. FDA issues Untitled Letters for violations that are less 
significant than those warranting a Warning Letter. Issuance of Untitled Letters, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/ucm511995.htm [https://perma.cc/YV7W-5 
HQR].  
57. See Letter from Alberto Gutierrez, Dir., Office of In Vitro Diagnostics & Radiological 
Health, Ctr. for Devices & Radiological Health, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Ann[e] Wojcicki, Chief 
Exec. Officer, 23andMe, Inc. (Nov. 22, 2013), https://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/Warni 
ngLetters/2013/ucm376296.htm [https://perma.cc/7YUD-4M55]. FDA issues Warning Letters for 
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health-related genetic tests.58 However, in 2015, FDA approved the first 
health-related DTC-GT for 23andMe’s DTC test for Bloom Syndrome.59 
This has been followed by more FDA authorization of health-related DTC-
GT, including 23andMe’s Health Predispositions tests for ten diseases60 and 
23andMe’s test for three BRCA breast cancer gene mutations in March 
2018.61 However, FDA only has the jurisdiction to regulate DTC tests that 
diagnose a disease62 and, thus, does not regulate any of the DTC-GT tests 
or services related to genealogy or lifestyle (e.g., the wellness or traits tests). 
In addition, FDA does not have jurisdiction to regulate other aspects of 
DTC-GT companies’ activities or data practices, thereby leaving the 
consumers’ genetic privacy largely outside of FDA’s reach.63  
In addition to FDA, CMS can regulate DTC-GT through enforcement of 
CLIA, which requires certification of “laboratories” that analyze biological 
materials to provide “information for the diagnosis, prevention, or treatment 
of any disease or impairment of, or the assessment of the health of, human 
beings.”64 CMS requires the laboratories to ensure the accuracy, precision, 
and analytical validity of the tests.65 However, similar to FDA, CMS only 
has the jurisdiction to regulate DTC tests that diagnose a disease or assess 
health. Indeed, while 23andMe states that its genotyping is performed in a 
CLIA-certified laboratory, 66  other DTC-GT companies providing non-
health genetic testing do not appear to be going through CLIA certification. 
In addition, CLIA only concerns a test’s analytical validity (how well the 
test detects a genetic variant) and not clinical validity (association of genetic 
variant with a disease) or clinical utility (whether the information is 
clinically useful or actionable).67 
Meanwhile, FTC has broad authority to regulate “unfair” or “deceptive” 
business practices under the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA).68 Also, 
while FDA regulates medical device labeling,69  FTC is responsible for 
 
58. For a more detailed discussion of FDA enforcement actions against DTC-GT companies 
during 2010 to 2014, see Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 55, at 704–17.  
59. Letter from Courtney Lias to Kathy Hibbs, supra note 3. 
60. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 4.  
61. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 6.  
62. See 21 C.F.R. § 809.3(a) (2018). 
63. In addition to the medical device itself, FDA regulates the labeling of devices and advertising 
of prescription devices. See 21 U.S.C. § 352 (2018).  
64. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(a) (2018); 42 C.F.R. § 493.2 (2018). 
65. See 42 C.F.R. § 493.1253(b)(2) (2018). 
66. The Science Behind 23andMe, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/genetic-science/ [http 
s://perma.cc/BC5W-9V3M]. 
67. See How Can Consumers Be Sure a Genetic Test Is Valid and Useful?, U.S. NAT’L LIBRARY 
OF MED.: GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/testing/validtest [https://perma. 
cc/8RN9-YPZ8].  
68. Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2018)). 
69. See 21 U.S.C. § 352 (2012). 











regulating non-prescription medical device advertising.70 As DTC-GT, by 
its nature, is available without prescription, regulation of DTC-GT 
advertising falls under FTC’s jurisdiction as well as DTC-GT companies’ 
data practices. Unfortunately, FTC has thus far limited its actions in the 
DTC-GT field to issuing consumer bulletins.71 For example, in December 
2017, FTC issued a statement warning consumers about the potential 
privacy risks of DTC-GT.72  
The most notable example of FTC’s action against a DTC-GT company 
was a complaint filed in May 2014 against GeneLink, Inc. and foru 
International Corporation, which used DTC genetic tests to match 
consumers to their nutritional supplements and skincare products.73 FTC 
alleged that the companies’ acts and practices related to data security were 
unfair or deceptive because they “[f]ailed to implement reasonable policies 
and procedures to protect the security of consumers’ personal information” 
and “[c]reated unnecessary risks to personal information,”74 where personal 
information included genetic information of “nearly 30,000 consumers.”75 
The companies entered into a consent agreement with FTC, which required 
them “to establish and maintain comprehensive data security programs and 
submit to security audits by independent auditors every other year for 20 
years.” 76  Under the current regulatory regime, the FTC likely has the 
broadest and most effective authority to regulate genetic information from 
DTC-GT companies via enforcement actions.  
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74. Id. at 13. 
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C. State Laws 
State laws can add a layer of regulation complementing federal statutes 
and agencies by regulating DTC-GT or genetic information. Studies have 
found that thirteen,77 or even fifteen,78 states effectively prohibit DTC-GT, 
and twelve states limit access to DTC-GT in certain aspects.79 However, the 
statutory language specifies the tests as those for diagnosis of disease or 
health. For example, New York prohibits laboratories from returning the 
test result “of a specimen submitted for evidence of human disease or 
medical condition” directly to a patient.80 And Maryland prohibits medical 
laboratories from performing tests or releasing test results directly to a 
patient without authorization,81 where the “medical laboratory” is defined 
as a facility that performs tests for “diagnosis and control of human disease” 
or “assessment of human health, nutrition, or medical conditions.”82 Since 
the FDA authorization of 23andMe’s tests, however, 23andMe can sell its 
DTC genetic tests to customers in New York and Maryland because the tests 
are designated as over-the-counter devices and thereby do not fall under the 
state law restrictions.83 In addition, it does not appear that Ancestry or other 
DTC-GT companies offering genealogy or lifestyle-related DTC-GT 
services are prohibited in these states.  
More relevant for protecting consumers’ genetic privacy are state laws 
regulating genetic information in various aspects. Currently, thirty-five 
states and the District of Columbia prohibit genetic discrimination in 
employment, 84  forty-eight states and the District of Columbia prohibit 
genetic discrimination in health insurance, 85  and twenty-three states 
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prohibit genetic discrimination in life insurance, disability insurance, or 
long-term care insurance. 86  In addition, forty-one states have laws 
protecting the privacy of genetic information.87 Most notable among the 
state genetic nondiscrimination and privacy laws is California. The 
California Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (CalGINA), enacted 
in 2011, extends the areas of protection from genetic discrimination to 
emergency medical services, housing, mortgage lending, education, and 
state funded programs. 88  More importantly, the California Consumer 
Privacy Act of 2018 (CCPA)89 is considered the most comprehensive and 
significant state privacy law comparable to the European Union’s General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).90 CCPA provides broad protection of 
consumers’ (“a natural person who is a California resident”) 91  genetic 
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D. Common Law 
While Warren and Brandeis advanced the tort concept of privacy in their 
influential article, The Right to Privacy, arguing that the common law 
should recognize a tort to protect an individual’s “inviolate personality” 
against disclosure of private information,94 it was William Prosser who later 
organized the concept into distinct torts, providing the foundation of the 
modern privacy tort.95 Prosser categorized privacy torts into the following 
four torts:  
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his 
private affairs. 
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the 
plaintiff. 
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the 
public eye. 
4. Appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the 
plaintiff’s name or likeness.96 
Among these four torts, the intrusion tort and disclosure tort can 
potentially address the invasion of DTC-GT consumers’ genetic privacy. 
Initially, it appears that misuse of an individual’s genetic information by the 
DTC-GT company97 would satisfy the elements of the intrusion tort, which 
are: (1) an intrusion into (2) the seclusion or private affairs that is (3) highly 
offensive to a reasonable person.98 While the early concept of intrusion was 
grounded in physical or spatial disturbances,99 it has evolved into preventing 
access to (or controlling) information about oneself.100 Therefore, misuse of 
genetic information by a DTC-GT company could be considered as an 
intrusion into one’s ability to control the information, thereby satisfying the 
first element. For the second and third elements, it is safe to assume that 
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genetic information is a private affair and a reasonable person could be 
highly offended if aspects of their genetic information were misused. This 
tort may also provide a cause of action following a data breach against an 
alleged hacker, though not necessarily the company itself. 
Similarly, the disclosure tort’s three elements—(1) publicity given to (2) 
private, non-newsworthy facts that are (3) highly offensive to a reasonable 
person101—could be satisfied in a case where a DTC-GT consumer’s genetic 
information has been released due to a data breach in the company’s 
database. A data breach would render the information “public,” thus 
satisfying the publicity element.102 The genetic information is likely to be 
considered “private facts,” and a reasonable person could be highly 
offended by the public release of their genetic information.103  
In theory, these torts can provide some level of redress for privacy harms 
to consumers and deter problematic conduct by hackers or companies. 
However, in reality, the privacy torts have not proven to be the most 
effective legal tool to protect consumer privacy.104 Most notably, courts 
have explained that there is no privacy protection once the information has 
been made public or shared with others.105 Therefore, the simple fact that an 
individual is a customer of the DTC-GT company—that is, the fact that the 
consumer has already consented for the company to collect and use his/her 
genetic information—might undermine the ability of consumers to protect 
their genetic privacy with privacy torts.106 Regardless, the utility of privacy 
torts in this area is unclear because there is currently no legal precedent 
recognizing these torts for consumers’ genetic information from DTC-GT 
companies.  
II. SERVICES OFFERED BY 23ANDME AND ANCESTRY 
A. 23andMe and Ancestry Services 
23andMe offers a number of ancestry and health information services.107 
Its testing services consist of the following five categories: (1) Health 
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Predispositions,108 (2) Ancestry, (3) Wellness, (4) Carrier Status,109 and (5) 
Traits. Importantly, as 23andMe states that its tests are CLIA-certified,110 
the tests have approved analytical validity.111 However, the categories of 
tests not approved by the FDA have uncertain clinical validity.112  
23andMe has eleven FDA-approved Health Predispositions tests 
including, for example, tests for the BRCA1 and 2 mutations for risk of 
breast cancer, age-related macular degeneration, alpha-1 antitrypsin 
deficiency, celiac disease, G6PD deficiency, hereditary hemochromatosis, 
hereditary thrombophilia, late-onset Alzheimer’s Disease, and Parkinson’s 
Disease.113 Recently, on March 10, 2019, 23andMe announced that it will 
be providing a new Health Predispositions report on type 2 diabetes.114 The 
report is based on polygenic risk score 115  developed from 23andMe’s 
research data and is not approved by FDA.116  The ancestry testing for 
23andMe covers more than thirty-five reports, including, for example, 
Ancestry Composition, Maternal Haplogroup, Paternal Haplogroup, 
Neanderthal Ancestry, Your DNA Family, and the DNA Relative Finder 
Tool. 117  23andMe’s Wellness reports include alcohol flush reaction, 
caffeine consumption, deep sleep, genetic weight, lactose intolerance, 
muscle composition, saturated fat and weight, and sleep movement.118 The 
23andMe Carrier Status reports cover more than forty reports, including, for 
example, Cystic Fibrosis, Sickle Cell Anemia, Hereditary Hearing Loss, 
Bloom Syndrome, Canavan Disease, Tay-Sachs Disease, and Usher 
Syndrome.119 And finally, the Traits reports include more than thirty reports. 
For example, consumers can receive information about hair color or male 
baldness, eye color, earwax type, cleft chin, cilantro taste aversion, cheek 
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110. The Science Behind 23andMe, 23ANDME, supra note 66.  
111. See U.S. NAT’L LIBRARY MED., supra note 67.  
112. The FDA approval process assesses analytical validity and clinical validity. Direct-to-
Consumer Tests, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedic 
alProcedures/InVitroDiagnostics/ucm624726.htm [https://perma.cc/2S24-WMWB] (last updated Nov. 
1, 2018). 
113. Health + Ancestry, 23ANDME, supra note 105. 
114. 23andMe Offers New Genetic Report on Type 2 Diabetes, 23ANDME (Mar. 10, 2019)., https: 
//blog.23andme.com/health-traits/type-2-diabetes/  
115. Polygenic risk score calculates the a person’s odds of developing a medical condition based 
on many genetic variants. Id.  
116. 23andMe’s new type 2 diabetes polygenic score report likely falls under FDA’s exemption 
for low-risk devices intended for general wellness use. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GENERAL 
WELLNESS: POLICY FOR LOW RISK DEVICES (Jul. 29, 2016), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalD 
evices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/UCM429674.pdf. 
117. Health + Ancestry, 23ANDME, supra note 105. 
118. Id.  
119. Id.  











dimples, the ability to match musical pitches, mosquito bite frequency, and 
wake-up time.120  
Ancestry, as their website states, is a service that “helps you understand 
your genealogy.”121 When combined with a consumer’s DNA sample, the 
AncestryDNA service seeks to provide more comprehensive ancestry 
information. Ancestry provides estimates of your ethnicity, where ancestors 
might have come from, “sometimes down to a city,” “a timeline of historical 
changes with expert-curated content,” migration information, and DNA 
matches to living relatives.122 AncestryDNA will also provide consumers 
with traits information similar to 23andMe, including, for example, finger 
length, sweet sensitivity, cilantro aversion, eye color, hair type, iris patterns, 
freckles, cleft chin, and earwax type.123 
Both companies allow consumers the option to participate in clinical 
research. For example, a consumer’s genetic information from 23andMe 
can be integrated into Apple’s ResearchKit app to be used for large scale 
medical studies.124 Ancestry consumers can participate in the “Ancestry 
Human Diversity Project” of which Ancestry is a part with other institutions 
and businesses.125  
B. The Potential Benefits of Using 23andMe and Ancestry Services 
Consumers may benefit in important ways by using the services of 
23andMe and Ancestry.126 The direct-to-consumer nature of the services 
means that consumers can access genetic testing without the healthcare 
system as a gatekeeper thereby providing more autonomy and potentially a 
lower price. 127  The information provided can empower consumers to 
mitigate the risks of certain diseases, allow for more informed family 
planning, or gain a better understanding of their heritage.128 To the extent 
consumers choose to participate in the research activities of 23andMe and 
Ancestry, they can contribute to the generalizable knowledge produced by 
the research. In fact, 23andMe’s collaboration with academic centers has 
resulted in 124 scientific publications since 2010 which have illuminated 
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the link between genetics and numerous medical conditions such as alcohol 
dependence and skin cancer.129  
Of course, 23andMe and Ancestry also benefit from these transactions. 
Presumably, these companies profit from the prices they charge to 
consumers for their services. More importantly, however, they benefit 
immensely by collecting and sharing, to the extent permissible by their 
respective privacy policies, large amounts of private information about 
consumers.130 23andMe not only collaborates with academic institutions 
and non-profit organizations but also with a number of pharmaceutical 
companies including Genentech and Pfizer.131 Industry also often invests in 
23andMe such as the recent $300 million investment by GSK.132  
III. GENETIC PRIVACY, RISK, AND HARM 
DTC-GT companies have been criticized since their inception more than 
a decade ago.133 Many of these critiques are ultimately grounded in concerns 
about exploitation of consumers, even if this isn’t explicitly stated. Here, we 
ask whether 23andMe and Ancestry protect consumer privacy in a 
justifiable manner. To answer this question, we need a normative 
framework to help us evaluate the risks to consumers, the benefits to the 
company and the consumer, and to what extent the fairness of the 
transaction justifies the data hygiene of 23andMe and Ancestry. As we 
explain below, transactions do not have to be risk-free, including free of 
privacy risk, to be justifiable. However, the privacy risks do have to be 
reasonable in relation to the benefits to be justifiable—this is what 
exploitation theory helps us understand, albeit in a rough sense. Using a 
more robust normative framework also helps minimize the use of intuition 
in the analysis. Finally, the unfairness of the transaction helps us determine 
to what extent there should be legal intervention.  
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To this end, this Part is structured into three sub-parts. First, we begin by 
sketching a theory of exploitation for our analysis. We then explain why 
privacy concerns in genetics may be heightened over other kinds of health 
information, a view known as “genetic exceptionalism.” And, finally, 
because exploitation requires an analysis of the risks and benefits, we 
provide an account of risk and harm in the DTC-GT context.  
A. The Central Normative Concern: Exploitation 
Exploitation is essentially the idea that it is wrong to take unfair 
advantage of someone. However, not all exploitation is morally troubling. 
In the nonmoral sense, exploitation “simply means to use something to 
advantage.”134 For example, “[a] weight lifter exploits his muscles to lift 
weights, a carpenter exploits his tools to build beautiful chairs, a scientist 
exploits a quirk of nature to make a new cosmological discovery or 
synthesize a new molecule.”135 The worry in the case of DTC-GT services 
is whether consumers are taken advantage of in some unfair or inappropriate 
way.  
Concerns about exploitation apply not only to the commercial 
transactions between consumers and 23andMe or Ancestry, but also to the 
research the DTC-GT companies conduct.136 However, because research 
ethics involves separate considerations, including other federal regulations, 
we will not pursue those issues here.  
Although there has been a substantial growth in contemporary 
scholarship on exploitation, especially in the clinical research context, we 
rely on Alan Wertheimer’s framework, which focuses on the distribution of 
benefits and burdens.137 Under Wertheimer’s view, exploitative transactions 
fall into two groups—consensual or nonconsensual transactions that are (1) 
harmful or (2) mutually advantageous. Harmful transactions are the most 
straightforward instances of exploitation and occur when “A gains by 
imposing a harm on B”—e.g., “slavery, extortion, [or] fraud.”138 Mutually 
advantageous exploitation, on the other hand, occurs when “both parties [to 
a transaction] . . . reasonably expect to gain from the transaction as 
contrasted with the pretransaction status quo.”139  
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To be clear, even though there may be consent to a transaction, the 
transaction can still be problematically exploitative.140 The reverse may also 
be true—there may be a nonconsensual transaction with a fair distribution 
of benefits that is, therefore, non-exploitative.141 This may just mean that 
the transaction is unethical for other reasons,142 for example, because it’s 
wrong to violate someone’s autonomy. The central inquiry, again, is 
whether a transaction is unfair. However, consent is still important—“the 
absence of valid consent is often a good indication that [a] transaction is a 
case of harmful exploitation rather than mutually advantageous 
exploitation.” 143  Acknowledging the difficulty in developing a precise 
account of unfairness, Wertheimer explains that “some mutually 
advantageous transactions are unfair by reference to an appropriate 
normative standard and that A exploits B when A gains more than A should 
(or B gains less than B should) from the transaction.”144 To put mutually 
advantageous exploitative transactions in a rough numerical format, there 
might be three possibilities: (1) no transaction, where A and B both gain 
nothing; (2) an unfair, mutually advantageous transaction, where A gains 
ten while B only gains one; and (3) a fair transaction, where A and B both 
gain five.145  
These transactions should be evaluated with several important factors in 
mind. First, these transactions should be evaluated from “an all-things-
considered point of view”—meaning, even if a transaction has negative 
elements (e.g., exchanging money for a product), we would not necessarily 
say the loss of money for one party and the loss of the product for the other 
amounts to a harmful transaction. 146  Similarly, here, we would not 
necessarily say that exchanging money and genetic data for the services of 
23andMe or Ancestry is harmful simply because there are some privacy 
risks associated with the service. Second, the transactions should be 
evaluated from “an ex ante rather than an ex post point of view.”147 This 
means that even if a transaction ends up being disappointing—e.g., not 
finding oil on land where one hoped to find oil—the transaction is not 
morally problematic if the “ex ante utility is clearly positive.”148 And third, 
a mutually advantageous transaction is not necessarily problematic “simply 
because A takes advantage of B’s vulnerabilities or desperate situation to 
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strike a deal.”149 There is an important distinction, Wertheimer explains, 
“between moral defects in B’s background situation and moral defects in 
the transactions that occur within that situation.”150 
However, even if a transaction is exploitative, there is a separate question 
of to what extent there should be some kind of “interference”—that is, a 
legal intervention to regulate these transactions.151 Wertheimer calls this the 
“moral force” of the claim of exploitation, emphasizing that “[w]rongness 
is one thing, and interference is another.”152 He explains that there is a fairly 
straightforward prima facie case for prohibiting an exploitative transaction 
when it is both harmful and nonconsensual.153 However, Wertheimer argues 
that there should be a strong presumption against prohibiting exploitative, 
or otherwise problematic, transactions that are mutually advantageous and 
consensual, so long as the transaction has no negative effects on others.154 
Importantly, the exploited party could still “reasonably refuse to participate 
in the transaction”—the question is whether the state should intervene.155 
This “presumption” is called the “principle of permissible exploitation 
(PPE).”156 Wertheimer reasons, in part, that the PPE may be defensible as 
“a plausible principle of nonideal moral theory.”157 In other words, unjust 
background conditions do exist and people have to make decisions in this 
unjust context. There should be a presumption that allows parties under 
these conditions to better their circumstances without state intervention, 
even though the terms of the transaction are unfair.158  
As the preceding discussion suggests, determining whether a practice is 
impermissibly exploitative can be complex and imprecise. However, the 
basic analysis should involve at least three components: (1) the adequacy of 
the consent, (2) the harms, and (3) the benefits. Accordingly, in Part IV, we 
evaluate the extent to which 23andMe and Ancestry’s various privacy 
policies can serve as an adequate consent for consumers, and the privacy 
harms and risks of the transaction to consumers as compared to the benefits 
to both the companies and consumers. Importantly, we want to emphasize 
that the use of DTC-GT services does not have to be harmless to be 
permissible from an all-things-considered perspective. Rather, it is the 
relationship between the various factors—consent, harms, and benefits—
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that determines the permissibility of these services. Because there are 
significant gaps in the legal system’s ability to properly regulate DTC-GT 
companies,159 the following normative analysis should help clarify what the 
primary concerns are and how the law can mitigate these concerns. Before 
providing an exploitation-based analysis of the policies and practices of 
23andMe and Ancestry, we provide an account of why genetic privacy 
might require additional attention.   
B. Genetic Exceptionalism and Genetic Privacy 
The view known as “genetic exceptionalism” is “the claim that genetic 
information is sufficiently different from other kinds of health-related 
information that it deserves special protection or other exceptional 
measures.” 160  While genetic exceptionalism has its supporters, 161  many 
have argued against this view, claiming that genetic information is neither 
unique nor sufficiently different from other kinds of medical information.162 
However, several important features of genetic information strongly support 
genetic exceptionalism: familial nature, predictive ability, function as a 
unique identifier, stability and immutability, and potential for 
discrimination and stigmatization based on genetic information.163  
First, genetic information reveals inherently shared information between 
genetically related family members. Of course, other medical information 
often has a familial nature. For example, infectious diseases such as 
tuberculosis and sexually transmitted infections (STIs) can be transmitted 
between family members living together.164 However, while tuberculosis in 
an individual suggests the mere possibility of an uncertain rate that family 
members might share the disease only if they were in contact or 
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cohabited, 165  the shared nature of genes—excluding spontaneous 
mutations—is absolute and mathematically predictable: one inherits half of 
each biological parent’s genes, shares at least a quarter of genetic material 
with one’s biological siblings, and so forth. The familial nature of genes 
also extends to relatives that one might have never encountered or lived 
with. 166  This certainty of the shared nature of genetic information has 
inspired debates about whether an index patient with the primary genetic 
information has a duty to inform the family about the genetic information 
that also pertains to them and whether the family members can claim a right 
to know (or not know).167 It has also led to a proposal for the “joint account” 
model of genetic information168 and recommendations for “cascade genetic 
testing” for family members in genetic diseases.169 
The second notable characteristic is the ability of genetic information to 
provide predictive information regarding an individual’s disease and health. 
This feature of genetic information becomes powerful when combined with 
its immutable nature. While results from most medical tests change over 
time, genome sequencing is a one-shot test with a raw result that remains 
constant over an individual’s lifetime.170 In addition, compared to other 
medical information, genetic information provides a myriad of information 
regarding one’s disease potential and phenotypes in the future—thus, “such 
a massive prospective difference in quantity effectively makes a qualitative 
difference.”171 This aspect of genetic information is often captured by the 
“future diary” metaphor.172 Of course, such metaphors must be treated with 
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caution given their potential to promote “genetic determinism” or “genetic 
prophecy.” 173  With advances in genomic science and medicine, most 
diseases with a genetic basis are found to be multifactorial with multiple 
genes contributing in varying degrees with varying penetrance.174  
Third, genetic information can be used to identify an individual. 
Combined with the stable and immutable nature, this feature is one that is 
wholly unique to genetic information. The recent arrest of the suspected 
Golden State Killer based on DNA evidence more than thirty years after his 
crimes has demonstrated the power of genetic information.175 Moreover, 
studies have demonstrated that surnames can be recovered from de-
identified genome sequences available on public databases and that surname, 
in combination with other metadata such as age and state, can be used to 
identify the individual 176  and that genetic information can be used to 
computationally predict a three-dimensional model of an individual’s 
face.177  
Finally, genetic information can be used to stigmatize or discriminate 
against people. Indeed, it could be argued that the enactment of GINA and 
genetic nondiscrimination laws in health insurance and/or employment in 
forty-eight states demonstrates our society’s acceptance of genetic 
exceptionalism, especially based on this potential for genetic 
discrimination.178  
Two additional aspects of genetic information—incidental findings and 
variability—which are not discussed in earlier works on genetic 
exceptionalism, further support the special nature of genetic information. 
Genetic test results often harbor incidental findings (IFs).179 IFs can occur 
in whole genome sequencing (WGS) or gene panels rather than traditional 
single gene tests.180 While a WGS (or a large-scale genetic test) is initially 
performed to find variants associated with specific symptoms or a potential 
diagnosis, the sequencing may find unexpected variants associated with 
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other conditions.181 Again, however, IFs are not unique to genetic testing. 
Several other medical tests share this characteristic such as the physical 
exam (one of the most traditional medical tests, ironically) and radiological 
tests.182 For example, a routine physical exam might find an unusual mole 
that turns out to be a skin carcinoma, or a chest X-ray to diagnose 
pneumonia might show an unexpected mass in the lung later determined as 
lung cancer. However, the key difference between these IFs and IFs in 
genetic tests is that while IFs from a physical exam or radiology are initial 
suggestions of a potential abnormality with clear next steps for further 
diagnosis, IFs in genetics often have no effective treatment or have unclear 
clinical significance thereby raising disagreements about the appropriate 
next steps.183 This fact inspires the debate on whether one’s right not to 
know IFs can (or should) be protected.184  
Genetic information shows variability both between tests and with time. 
Raw data from an initial genetic test is not interpretable by any human being. 
Only after analysis through computational methods does the data start to 
adopt a form that is understandable, albeit only to trained bioinformaticians 
and genetics researchers. Interpretation of data, especially to reach a form 
understandable by patients, requires many steps including genotype-
phenotype correlation and a proper understanding of causality involving 
multiple factors aided by Bayesian analysis.185 Analysis of WGS is still in 
flux in that there are multiple analysis programs that are being used and no 
standard of practice exists. 186  In fact, there have been reports where 
23andMe and Ancestry have provided completely differing results to a 
consumer.187 Also, there is a temporal dimension of variability in genetic 
information. That is, the significance of information can change in light of 
new scientific or clinical findings. Genetics is a rapidly evolving field, and 
information from current data is being fed to generate more information 
about particular genotypes and mutations and, subsequently, phenotypes 
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and pathogenicity. A variant of unknown significance (VUS) might later be 
found to be pathogenic as we learn more about the genome.188  
Thus, while opponents of genetic exceptionalism argue that the features 
of genetic information are not unique or are not sufficient to warrant special 
treatment of genetic information, we believe the preceding arguments 
support the notion of genetic exceptionalism. Notably, Professor Mark 
Rothstein has been especially critical of genetic exceptionalism, arguing 
that it is difficult to clearly define genetic information and separate genetic 
information from nongenetic information.189 Yet such arguments appear to 
conflate certain practical challenges with the conceptual argument for 
genetic exceptionalism. Moreover, these practical barriers can be overcome 
with the use of the electronic health record190 and the adoption of a narrow 
definition of genetic information in genetic-specific statutes.191 Therefore, 
while genetic information shares many characteristics with health 
information in general, the additional characteristics and related concerns 
likely provide sufficient support for genetic exceptionalism and warrant a 
more careful analysis and discussion of genetic privacy. 
C. Defining Risk and Harm 
In the context of DTC-GT, “genetic privacy” can be defined as the notion 
“that everyone should enjoy protection of his or her genetic information 
from unauthorized collection, processing, use and distribution, and that 
certain uses of genomic data must be forbidden because they impact data 
subjects in ways that are considered unjust, unfair, or outright 
discriminatory.”192 As this definition suggests, the collection, storage, use, 
and transfer of data poses a number of important risks to individual 
consumers when they use DTC-GT services. Evaluating risk involves a 
three-part analysis: (1) defining the kind of harm, (2) determining the 
magnitude of that harm, and (3) empirically assessing the likelihood that the 
harm will occur.193  
A common definition of harm is philosopher Joel Feinberg’s notion that 
harm “is a set-back to a legitimate interest.”194 A person is harmed “if they 
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are in worse shape than they would be in had the activity not occurred.”195 
For a harm to be legally cognizable, the law must recognize that the harm is 
“worthy of redress, deterrence, or punishment.”196  
In the field of privacy law, harm is defined in many ways. Among those, 
three leading frameworks are notable. First, Professor Ryan Calo divides 
privacy harms into two categories—subjective and objective harms.197 A 
subjective privacy harm “is the perception of unwanted observation,” where 
“observation” encompasses information revealed, either directly or by 
inference, from a data breach. 198  In the health context, anxiety, 
embarrassment, or stigma are examples of subjective privacy harms.199 
Importantly, subjective privacy harms have real implications for an 
individual’s health. Pervasive stigma, for example, serves as a crucial 
barrier to quelling the HIV epidemic because patients’ lack of trust in the 
healthcare system encourages them to forego care.200 HIV aside, health data 
breaches may also undermine an individual’s trust in the health care system 
in general, and they may therefore avoid treatment or lie about or withhold 
health information resulting in inappropriate or inadequate treatment.201 
Importantly, many patients, not just the victims of a data breach, have 
withheld health information from care providers because of privacy 
concerns.202  
Objective privacy harms, on the other hand, are those “that are external 
to the victim and involve the forced or unanticipated use of personal 
information.” 203  For example, in a recent Ninth Circuit genetic 
discrimination case, Chadam v. Palo Alto Unified School District,204 the 
unauthorized disclosure of a student’s genetic information, and subsequent 
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inaccurate perceptions of that information, led to him being moved to 
another middle school.205  
Second, Professors Daniel J. Solove and Woodrow Hartzog derive 
several categories of harms by analyzing enforcement actions brought by 
the FTC under Section 5 for unfair or deceptive trade practices.206 Because 
the vast majority of enforcement actions brought by the FTC have resulted 
in settlement agreements, there are very few court opinions defining the 
rules and norms for company privacy policies.207 However, companies do 
rely on the FTC settlements as a sort of common law defining, or at least 
guiding, company information privacy obligations.208 For deception claims, 
four categories of harms emerged: (1) broken promises of privacy, (2) 
general deception, (3) insufficient notice, and (4) data security. 209  For 
unfairness claims brought by the FTC, there were five categories of harms: 
(1) retroactive changes, (2) deceitful data collection, (3) improper use of 
data, (4) unfair design or unfair default settings, and (5) unfair data security 
practices.210  
And finally, Professor Joel R. Reidenberg and colleagues derived several 
categories of privacy harms by conducting a more comprehensive analysis 
including FTC enforcement actions as well as “all federal class action 
complaints alleging online privacy violations filed” over an almost fifteen-
year period.211 Based on this data, the most common privacy harms were (1) 
unauthorized disclosure of personal information, (2) surreptitious collection 
of personal information, (3) failure to secure personal information, and (4) 
unlawful retention of personal information.212 Reidenberg and colleagues 
then explain that while the notice and choice framework is the most 
common for managing consumer privacy, there are limits to the 
effectiveness of notice and choice to manage or mitigate the privacy harms 
consumers experience.213 So long as notices are “complete, understandable 
for users, accurate, and specific” and “accompanied by meaningful choice,” 
this model is most helpful for unauthorized disclosure, surreptitious 
collection, and, to some extent, improper retention.214 They argue, however, 
that notice and choice cannot protect consumers against inadequate data 
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security practices, deception (i.e., acting contrary to a privacy policy), and 
other instances of the wrongful retention of data.215 
 While these frameworks provide an important conceptual model for 
evaluating privacy harms, they do not provide a complete account for the 
unique privacy harms posed by DTC-GT services. Therefore, we propose 
three categories of privacy harms of DTC-GT for the purpose of our analysis: 
(1) knowledge harms, (2) autonomy and trust-based harms, and (3) the 
harms of data misuse. 
Knowledge harms, although acknowledged or implied by the bioethics 
literature in some form,216 are unaccounted for by the extant frameworks in 
privacy law and include the harms associated with receiving health 
information (e.g., in the form of test results), expected or unexpected, that 
is troubling, inaccurate, or misleading. To the extent the information is 
sufficiently accurate, it is irrevocable—that is, one cannot unknow the 
information. For example, ancestry testing may reveal unexpected 
information about a family’s ethnicity, country of origin, or paternity and 
maternity.217 This information may be welcome to many consumers but may 
also cause significant distress, strain family relations, or undermine 
someone’s self-identity.218 Or a consumer might unexpectedly find out they 
have a significant risk of developing a disease later in life.219 Alternatively, 
the test results may reveal expected information, but individuals may feel 
very differently about the information than originally anticipated. At the 
core of this privacy harm is loosing control over the nature and impact of 
the information. Importantly, because genetic information is familial and 
hereditary, knowledge harms also include potential implications for 
genetically related family members who, in many instances, may not have 
even agreed to or been informed of the testing.  
Additionally, knowledge harms include the often drastic steps people 
may take to minimize their risk of disease. For example, after finding that 
she had an 87% chance of getting breast cancer, Angelina Jolie underwent 
a double mastectomy. 220  In addition, individuals may choose to forgo 
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having children because of their carrier status test results. Such choices and 
actions can be problematic given that the information returned to consumers 
may be inaccurate, misunderstood, or incomplete. Inaccurate results include 
both false positives—the test incorrectly finds a genetic variant that is not 
actually present—and false negatives—the test does not find a genetic 
variant that is actually present. Because 23andMe and Ancestry offer 
services that are direct-to-consumer, they do not, by definition, have an 
expert intermediary to evaluate and explain results. Thus, it is easy for 
consumers to misinterpret results by not considering or taking seriously 
non-genetic factors like lifestyle. Consumers may also not realize that other 
genetic variants not accounted for in the test results play an important role 
in health outcomes. These potential inaccuracies or misunderstandings may 
cause consumers to experience unnecessary stress over test results, obtain 
unnecessary healthcare, 221  or miss a critical opportunity to prevent or 
manage future illness.  
By contrast, autonomy and trust-based harms are the focus of a large 
literature and encompass concerns regarding notice and choice. 222 
Autonomy and trust are the central principles at stake when consumers 
cannot adequately consent to the collection and use of their private 
information or companies disclose or use information in unauthorized ways. 
Although there is disagreement on the precise definition of autonomy, 
autonomy can roughly be described as the notion that individuals should 
have the right to control what happens to their information and bodies 
without “controlling interference by others.”223 Trust can be defined as “the 
‘favourable expectation regarding other people’s actions and intentions,’ or 
the belief that others will behave in a predictable manner.”224 Proper consent 
allows consumers to make decisions consistent with their values and, to 
some degree, protect their own welfare, but it also promotes trust between 
consumers and companies.  
Finally, data misuse harms include data breaches, which are a kind of 
data misuse; the unauthorized reidentification of otherwise deidentified data 
sets; or other consequences of unauthorized data use. These harms can 
encompass both the subjective and objective harms of the Calo framework, 
for example, anxiety following a data breach (subjective) or genetic 
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discrimination (objective). A data breach occurs when personal information, 
stored electronically or otherwise,225 is lost, stolen, or otherwise accessed 
without proper authorization.226 Following a data breach of, for example, a 
bank, retailer, or consumer reporting agency, critical personal information, 
including a social security number, name, and address, may be revealed 
about a victim. This information is certainly sensitive and may subject data 
breach victims to identity theft or an increased risk of identity theft, anxiety 
over the potential misuse of their private information, and identity theft 
mitigation costs. 227  Identify theft occurs when someone’s personal 
information is used for fraudulent purposes, including, for example, 
unauthorized credit card purchases or taking out a loan.228  
The magnitude of harm in the privacy context may be difficult to 
precisely define because, for example, social norms change over time or 
new laws are enacted to protect people against various forms of 
discrimination. However, based on the preceding discussion on genetic 
exceptionalism, we can see that the magnitude of genetic privacy harms may 
be quite significant because, for example, genetic information serves as a 
unique identifier, it implicates third parties, and it cannot be replaced. 
Consumers may also make consequential medical decisions based on both 
accurate or inaccurate information or may choose to forgo having children 
because of carrier test results. Finally, as we explained in Section III.B, the 
value of genetic information changes over time as we learn more about the 
predictive power of the genome. So not only does genetic information 
currently contain a significant volume of consequential information about 
you and your family, but the volume and utility of that information will only 
grow over time.    
Accordingly, we can see that the magnitude of a genetic privacy harm 
can be quite significant. But how likely are these harms to occur? Given the 
wide variety of potential genetic privacy harms, we need more data on the 
likelihood that certain harms will occur. However, data breaches involving 
health data are growing in frequency and account for forty percent of data 
breaches.229 In 2013, almost sixty-three percent of data breaches involved 
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patient medical records.230 A 2012 report from the Ponemon Institute found 
that more health care organizations are having multiple breaches and 
negligence continues to be at the root of many data breaches.231 Furthermore, 
the data breaches are expensive, costing the organizations participating in 
their study $2.4 million over a two-year period.232 Thomson explains that 
many health data breaches are the result of poor security practices. For 
example, “more than one-third of data breaches resulted from the theft or 
loss of laptops, computers, hard drives, backup tapes, PDAs, or other 
portable media containing unencrypted personal information.”233  Health 
data breaches also result from insider attacks, hackers, inadvertent postings 
on websites, or other disclosures, like when medical records were dumped 
on a sidewalk or found in a dumpster.234 
In addition, as we noted in Section I.A, the EEOC has received over 200 
charges per year filed under GINA since 2010. This may be a relatively low 
number of discrimination claims, but this serves as a useful indicator that 
genetic discrimination is happening with some regularity. The likelihood of 
harm may also increase, for example, as we learn more about the genome, 
it becomes easier to de-identify anonymized datasets, or the risks of data 
breaches grow. All of these risk considerations weigh in favor of more 
comprehensive and substantial legal reforms.        
IV. ANALYSIS OF 23ANDME AND ANCESTRY POLICIES AND PRACTICES 
In this Part, we will assess to what extent 23andMe and Ancestry protect 
against the privacy risks discussed in Part III through a combination of their 
consent and data management practices. The primary goal, in our view, is 
to minimize the exploitation of consumers. Because both 23andMe and 
Ancestry amass a significant amount of private information when 
consumers use their services, there are, as already explained, important risks 
to using their services. However, consumers can take on risk—we allow 
people to purchase and drive cars, fly, or skydive. The issue, again, is 
whether there is a fair distribution of benefits.  
A. The Adequacy of 23andMe’s Privacy Policies 
As explained in Part III.B, exploitative transactions may be either 
consensual or nonconsensual, but consent matters because the lack of 
consent may be probative of a harmful transaction or make a transaction 
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otherwise unethical even if the transaction is nonexploitative. Worries about 
consent generally encompass concerns about voluntariness, the adequacy of 
the information provided, and the competence of the party tokening 
consent.235  
23andMe provides information to consumers about their privacy 
practices and the risks of their services in a number of different pages 
throughout their website. There is a clear effort to provide much of this 
information in an accessible format in addition to a more comprehensive 
privacy policy 236  and terms of service. 237  For example, on the “What 
Unexpected Things Might I Learn From 23andMe?” page, a helpful 
overview is given of the kinds genetic information returned to consumers, 
including information about health, ancestry, family, and relationships.238 
The site encourages consumers to obtain genetic counseling and addresses 
many of the knowledge harms explained above. In addition, the full privacy 
policy begins with a relatively short “Privacy Highlights” section that gives 
an overview of the information collected, how that information is used, the 
extent to which consumers can control how their data is used, who has 
access to consumer data, data security practices, and the risks of using their 
services. And finally, the research consent document provides a helpful 
“Key Points” section prior to the more detailed consent document.239 This 
section explains, for example, what information is used, who gets to see that 
information, and the risks and benefits of participating in their research 
activities. 
In addition to the main privacy and consent documents, the 23andMe 
health reports returned to consumers attempt to provide test results in an 
accessible and properly qualified format. For example, in the Alzheimer’s 
Disease sample report, consumers are provided helpful background 
information about Alzheimer’s, the purpose of the genetic test, the 
limitations of the test, and information about other factors that contribute to 
Alzheimer’s. 240  A similar format is used to provide information about 
“Genetic Weight” test results as part of 23andMe’s wellness services.241  
 
235. Wertheimer, supra note 137, at at 75–77.  
236. Privacy Highlights, 23ANDME, supra note 217. 
237. Terms of Service, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/about/tos/ [https://perma.cc/FQ4N-
NG7C]. 
238. What Unexpected Things Might I Learn from 23andMe?, 23ANDME, https://customercare.23 
andme.com/hc/en-us/articles/202907980-What-unexpected-things-might-I-learn-from-23andMe- [https 
://perma.cc/3D7C-W789]. 
239. Research Consent Document, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/about/consent/ [https:// 
perma.cc/J4ED-RWB2]. 
240. Sample Report: Late-Onset Alzheimer’s Disease, 23ANDME, https://permalinks.23andme.co 
m/pdf/samplereport_genetichealth.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XF4-CUGH]. 
241. Sample Report: Genetic Weight, 23ANDME, https://permalinks.23andme.com/pdf/samplerep 












Despite these attempts to aid consumer comprehension, however, it is 
unlikely these documents allow consumers to make sufficiently informed 
decisions. There are at least five separate pages on the 23andMe site that 
provide critical privacy information—“What Unexpected Things Might I 
Learn From 23andMe,” the terms of service, the privacy policy, the research 
consent document, and the biobanking consent document. The privacy 
policy, terms of service, and the full research consent form are long, 
complex, and difficult to understand and amount to roughly fifty printed 
pages of reading. A 2010 study of the readability of DTC-GT websites 
found that the average reading level required was “grade 15.”242 It is well-
known that consumers generally do not read privacy policies or terms of 
service.243 It is also essentially impossible for consumers to spend the time 
reading all the terms of service documents they might be presented with 
even if they wanted.244 However, given that this is not a normal consumer 
transaction, consumers may be more motivated to actually read these 
privacy policies before agreeing to the service, but this is unclear. But even 
if consumers do read the policies, it’s difficult to see how they could come 
away with a sufficient understanding of the risks and benefits of using this 
service.  
For example, while the page on unexpected results provides a helpful 
overview of the potential knowledge harms, the most comprehensive 
explanation of the risks is provided in the terms of service. The discussion 
of risk provided in the terms of service is well-organized and offers a more 
detailed risk discussion than anywhere else on the 23andMe website. The 
problem is that the terms of service, like those of any other website, are long 
and technical and consumers are, again, unlikely to understand or even read 
the terms of service. This makes sense, however, because some research 
shows that consumers become less interested in DTC-GT services when 
they are provided with more risk information.245 
Given that 23andMe’s Health Predispositions tests report predisposition 
to specific diseases, there is greater risk of knowledge harms especially 
when consumers misinterpret the results. For example, 23andMe’s 
BRCA1/BRCA2 test only looks at three BRCA variants that are most 
common in the Ashkenazi Jewish population and not in other ethnicities 
while there are more than 1,000 BRCA variants associated with risk of 
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breast and ovarian cancer. 246  While 23andMe’s website presents this 
information clearly and, in fact, emphasizes it,247 it is still possible that a 
consumer with a “negative” 23andMe BRCA report might misconstrue the 
result and believe that she will not get breast cancer. In addition, the 
polygenic score for type 2 diabetes is another test that is vulnerable to 
misinterpretation. While 23andMe clearly states that the test “does not 
diagnose type 2 diabetes or prediabetes and should not be used to make 
medical decisions[,]”248 experts have questioned the value of the genetic 
predisposition information for type 2 diabetes and emphasized the potential 
for misinterpretation based on one’s ethnicity given that 23andMe’s 
polygenic score is based on its own database which is largely people of 
European ancestry.249  
Ambiguous language in the privacy policies might constitute additional 
autonomy and trust-based harms. For example, if a consumer does not 
consent to 23andMe Research,250 23andMe provides that:  
If you choose not to complete a Consent Document or any additional 
agreement with 23andMe, your Personal Information will not be 
used for 23andMe Research. However, your Genetic Information and 
Self-Reported Information may still be used by us and shared with 
our third party service providers to as outlined in this Privacy 
Statement.251 
While a consumer is likely to assume that no consent means no personal 
information—including genetic information and any self-reported 
information—would be used for additional research, 23andMe somehow 
differentiates “personal information” from “genetic information,” and “self-
reported information” in this context. However, under its definition of terms, 
both genetic information and self-reported information are sub-types of 
“personal information” alongside with “registration information,” 
“sensitive information,” “user content,” and “web-behavior information.”252 
Thus, 23andMe’s privacy policy appears to contradict itself and thereby 
provides inadequate notice to conumers.  
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Also, it is unclear from these documents which test results are, in some 
sense, accurate and what that means for consumers when they are 
interpreting their results—including analytic validity, clinical validity, and 
clinical utility. For example, although several of their genetic tests are 
approved by the FDA, ancestry and wellness testing is not. FDA approval 
for some tests but not others may give other test results an inappropriate 
amount of legitimacy. Several documents also include disclaimers about the 
accuracy and utility of the results provided which further undermines the 
ability of consumers to make informed decisions.253  
B. The Adequacy of Ancestry’s Privacy Policies  
Similar to the 23andMe website, the Ancestry and AncestryDNA 
websites attempt, at various points, to provide important privacy 
information in a clear and accessible manner. For example, there is a brief, 
but useful, video about how Ancestry protects consumers’ private 
information.254 Ancestry also has a user-friendly privacy center website, 
emphasizing transparency of data practices, simplicity in their policies, and 
consumer control over their data. This page also provides several FAQs 
regarding the data collected, consumer privacy, data security, data sharing, 
and advertising and cookies.  
The Ancestry policies, however, suffer from the same defects as 
23andMe. There are several primary privacy documents, including the 
privacy policy,255 the terms and conditions of service,256 and the informed 
consent for those who wish to participate in research.257 Like most privacy 
policies, these documents are long, complex, and difficult to read and 
understand. Unlike the 23andMe website, Ancestry provides almost no 
information about the potential risks of using its services. While Ancestry 
does provide information about its data security practices and how 
consumer data is kept secure, the only webpage with risk information is the 
research consent form.258 The consent form helpfully provides a discussion 
of the risks of a data breach and some of the potential knowledge harms 
associated with test results. However, not every person that uses Ancestry 
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services will choose to participate in research and read the consent form, 
and the research consent form only addresses the risks of participating in 
the research, not necessarily the risks of using Ancestry services more 
broadly.  
In addition, without any FDA-approval or CLIA-certification, there is no 
additional information on Ancestry’s website regarding the validity of its 
tests, including its ancestry services and various other “Ancestry DNA 
Traits” like cilantro aversion, freckles, earwax type, bitter sensitivity, and 
cleft chin. 259  Indeed, the Ancestry Terms and Conditions explicitly 
disclaims the accuracy and reliability of their test results.260 As explained 
above, if consumers are going to pay for a service and take on the risks 
associated with sharing private information, especially genetic information, 
the service provided should offer some discernable benefit.  
The misleading nature of the privacy policies of 23andMe and Ancestry 
do not mean there is per se exploitation—there may be a fair distribution of 
benefits here—but, as explained in Part III.B, the inadequacy of the consent 
here may be probative of harmful exploitation or otherwise unethical. 
Additionally, and more importantly for our purposes, problematic privacy 
policies may subject 23andMe and Ancestry to legal challenges, for 
example, by the FTC.  
C. The Distribution of Benefits  
As noted above, whether or not a transaction is consensual, the 
transaction may be (1) harmful and exploitative, (2) mutually advantageous 
but still exploitative, or (3) sufficiently fair to be nonexploitative. This 
depends on the distribution of the harms and benefits to consumers and the 
companies. Accordingly, we first address some of the primary benefits of 
these transactions to both consumers and companies. Second, we consider 
some of the primary harms. Third, and finally, we evaluate to what extent 
the distribution of benefits from these transactions amounts to a fair 
distribution.  
We explained in Part II.B. that there may be a number of benefits to 
consumers who use 23andMe and Ancestry. In the form of test results, both 
companies provide ancestry information and genetic traits testing, while 
23andMe also provides a number of FDA-approved tests for things like the 
BRCA mutation or genetic variants associated with Celiac Disease, 
Parkinson’s Disease, or Late-Onset Alzheimer’s Disease. A number of 
obvious benefits may flow from these test results, such as making 
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appropriate lifestyle changes, beginning early treatment for a disease, 
clarifying family relationships, or better understanding one’s heritage.  
However, these benefits, and any others, all hinge on whether the test 
results provided by 23andMe and Ancestry are sufficiently reliable. Aside 
from the FDA-approved tests, there is no indication that the other tests 
provide consumers with sufficiently reliable results. This is not to say that 
test results must be perfectly accurate to provide consumers with a sufficient 
benefit, but there should be some standardized method for assessing the 
reliability of genetic traits testing and ancestry testing in order for this 
testing to be considered a benefit to consumers. Importantly, as noted above, 
both 23andMe and Ancestry disclaim the accuracy of many of their test 
results.  
 23andMe’s FDA-approved tests do plausibly provide consumers with a 
benefit because those tests should accurately identify the relevant genetic 
variants (analytic validity) and those genetic variants should be associated 
with a disease (clinical validity). However, their tests are not validated for 
clinical utility. 261  This is, in part, because the tests are also not fully 
comprehensive, unlike clinical diagnostic tests, and do not necessarily 
identify the broader range of variants associated with a disease. 262  In 
addition, one recent study found a 40% false-positive rate for genetic health 
tests when the raw genetic data was interpreted either by the company that 
did the sequencing or by a third party interpreting raw sequencing data 
provided by another company. 263  However, to the extent 23andMe 
minimizes the false positive and negative rates of its genetic health tests, 
these tests can be considered beneficial for providing some insight into a 
consumer’s health risks.  
The benefits to 23andMe and Ancestry are fairly patent. They receive 
revenue in exchange for their services and they receive a significant amount 
of private information about an individual, most notably in the form of 
biospecimen and resultant genetic data. In addition, the companies are also 
working with pharmaceutical companies and research institutes to conduct 
research with the data they receive from consumers.264  
As we explained in Part III.C, the potential harms of DTC-GT can be 
broken into three categories—(1) knowledge harms, (2) autonomy and trust-
based harms, and (3) the harms of data misuse. Knowledge harms include 
the harms associated with receiving health information in the form of test 
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results, expected or unexpected, that are troubling, inaccurate, or misleading. 
If the information is sufficiently accurate, consumers may experience 
nonnegligible, but still not clinically significant stress or anxiety over their 
test results.265 While test results could inspire positive behavioral health 
changes, some studies suggest that these benefits are fairly modest266 or 
have no effect. 267  However, test results are not always accurate—as 
explained above, the accuracy of many tests is uncertain and one study 
found a 40% false positive rate with genetic data from DTC-GT 
companies.268 All of these studies are general, thus it is unclear to what 
extent or how often these concerns apply specifically to 23andMe and 
Ancestry.  
Autonomy and trust-based harms encompass concerns about notice, 
choice, and deception. As described above, 23andMe and Ancestry do not 
provide sufficiently clear and understandable information for consumers to 
offer a valid consent. It is unclear whether 23andMe and Ancestry are 
actually deceiving consumers without more information about their data 
security and management practices. 
The harms of data misuse are the harms associated with, for example, 
data breaches or the reidentification of otherwise deidentified data sets. Data 
breaches are growing in frequency, and health data breaches account for a 
large portion of these breaches.269 23andMe and Ancestry claim to use 
industry standard data protection methods.270 However, given the frequency 
of data breaches, it is unclear how protective these data security measures 
could be. Without access to the data security measures taken by 23andMe 
and Ancestry, we cannot make definitive claims about the security risks to 
consumer data. However, we can at least infer that these risks are 
nonnegligible if data breach trends are any indicator. Furthermore, even if 
the probability of a data breach is fairly low—especially as compared to the 
rest of the industry—the magnitude of the harm is more considerable for a 
breach of consumer genetic data than other kinds of consumer data. That is, 
genetic information is immutable and not replaceable, whereas a consumer 
can much more easily replace a credit card or even a social security number. 
Thus, the risks of data breaches to 23andMe and Ancestry are greater 
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because of the more substantial harm magnitude, even if the probability of 
a data breach is similar to other consumer data breaches.   
Overall, there may be an unfair distribution of benefits—test results to 
consumers and money and genetic data to the companies—and burdens—
the privacy risks that consumers take on for the services. The privacy 
policies, including the terms of service and various other documents aimed 
at informing consumers, are also problematically unclear. Whether the 
consumers benefit assumes the accuracy and utility of the test results, which 
is uncertain for all but the FDA-approved genetic health tests provided by 
23andMe. To be clear, this is not to say that the test results do not provide a 
benefit, just that this is an open question without further validation. Thus, 
consumers are trading money and valuable data to 23andMe and Ancestry 
for a service that is, ex ante, of questionable benefit—again, excepting the 
FDA-approved tests. Even assuming that there is some benefit to consumers, 
but the transaction is still unfair and therefore mutually advantageous 
exploitation, there are at least two reasons for more substantial and 
comprehensive legal reform. First, as we explained in Section III.A, when 
a mutually advantageous exploitative transaction implicates third parties 
and not just a party to the transaction, legal intervention is more appropriate. 
Genetic information necessarily implicates third parties. Second, even with 
a better consent, consent has its limits—especially in this context where it 
is unlikely that consumers read the relevant privacy policies. But if 
consumers did read the policies, the preceding discussion should 
demonstrate that the risks of using DTC-GT are both conceptually and 
empirically complex. This makes it hard for consumers to protect their own 
welfare via consent.  
Accordingly, in the following Part, we provide a number of 
recommendations to help reduce the disparities in these transactions and 
better protect consumers.   
V. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
Given the inadequacy of DTC-GT companies’ privacy policies to protect 
the consumers’ genetic privacy and other issues posed by DTC-GT services, 
this Part examines several potential solutions to this problem. First, the 
DTC-GT industry can improve self-regulation by updating privacy policies 
or data practices and grounding test results in validated science. Second, 
FTC can provide more stringent regulatory activity in overseeing the DTC-
GT companies’ data practices. And, finally, we encourage comprehensive 
data privacy legislation which includes genetic information. 
We have already argued that legal reform to promote genetic privacy can 
be justified by protecting consumers from exploitation. However, protection 











of genetic privacy can also be guided by the normative and legal notion of 
trust. The “Partial Entrustment Model,” proposed by philosopher Henry 
Richardson, offers an ethical justification for obligations of medical 
researchers towards study participants.271 Richardson provides that a special 
moral duty of researchers stems from the participants’ partial entrustment 
of some “aspects of their health to the researchers.”272 Privacy rights serve 
as one of the three moral assumptions for the Partial Entrustment model 
where “[a]ll individuals have privacy rights pertaining to their bodies . . . 
and their medical histories” which “limit others’ access thereto.” 273 
Richardson explains that the research participants’ privacy rights are 
selectively waived through the consent process and such waiver results in 
transfer of responsibility to the researchers.274 This model not only applies 
to the clinical research context but can also serve as a normative basis for 
other relationships requiring special duties and/or involving sensitive 
information. 275  This view is broadly consistent with Professors Neil 
Richards and Woodrow Hartzog’s argument to adopt a trust-based 
framework in privacy law.276 A trust-based framework can induce DTC-GT 
companies to ensure substantial and meaningful protection of the consumers’ 
genetic privacy as well as provide justification for better regulatory 
oversight as suggested below. 
A. Improving DTC-GT Industry Self-Regulation 
With significant gaps in regulatory oversight of the DTC-GT industry 
and its data practices,277 the current standard governing the protection of 
DTC-GT consumers’ genetic privacy is largely left to the industry’s self-
regulation. Despite the companies’ efforts to establish industry-wide “Best 
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Practices,”278 however, the current practices remain inadequate to protect 
the consumers from privacy risks.279 Based on our analysis, there are a 
number of areas where 23andMe and Ancestry can improve their privacy 
policies. For example, 23andMe can clarify its confusing definition of 
various types of personal information which, at its current state, is 
potentially misleading to consumers.280 Ancestry cleverly focuses on the 
importance of trust and consumer privacy, but should also have an explicit 
discussion of the privacy risks of using their services. And, both Ancestry 
and 23andMe can provide more information regarding their efforts to 
prevent data breaches and plans to mitigate the harm if a breach were to 
occur. Ultimately, however, these profit-driven entities are unlikely to make 
the substantial changes needed to their privacy policies and practices 
because those changes undermine their business model. Accordingly, legal 
intervention is the better route to improve consumer privacy. And, even if 
these companies did substantially improve their self-regulation, there would 
still be important gaps for the law to fill.     
B. Increased Federal Agency Oversight 
Among the federal agencies that have jurisdiction to regulate DTC-GT 
companies,281 FTC has the capacity and specific jurisdiction to oversee the 
data practices of the companies to ensure the protection of consumers’ 
genetic privacy. FTC has thus far limited its regulatory action to issuing 
statements for consumers,282 and more stringent oversight is required from 
the FTC in order to protect the DTC-GT consumers’ genetic information.283 
Through its consent orders, FTC can require companies to make changes to 
their privacy policies or implement comprehensive privacy programs. For 
example, FTC ordered Sony BMG to have “a clear and conspicuous notice” 
regarding its data practice on personal information from children in its 
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regarding their privacy policies, but the agency has declined to comment. Baram, supra note 72.  











privacy policy,284 and mandated Google to “establish and implement . . . a 
comprehensive privacy program that is reasonably designed to: (1) address 
privacy risks related to the development and management of new and 
existing products and services for consumers, and (2) protect the privacy 
and confidentiality of covered information.” 285  FTC should consider 
whether such enforcement actions can be done to DTC-GT companies if an 
investigation finds their privacy polices and/or practices to be inadequate.286  
In addition, FTC should consider interagency collaboration with the 
FDA and/or the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
given these agencies’ expertise regarding medical devices and health 
information and practices. For example, the Secretary’s Advisory 
Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society’s report on DTC-GT 
recommends a joint HHS-FTC task force to develop guidelines for FTC in 
its regulation of DTC-GT companies.287  FTC already provides a “Best 
Practices” guideline for mobile health app developers with an emphasis on 
data privacy and security.288 Such guidelines can serve as a prototype for 
DTC-GT companies and FTC’s accompanying regulation of such 
companies’ data practices.  
C. Comprehensive Data Privacy Legislation 
Since 1991, there have been several failed attempts to pass genetic 
privacy legislation.289 However, given the heightened interest and concern 
for genetic privacy, is the time finally ripe for a comprehensive genetic 
privacy law? With the enactment of GINA, however, it would not be 
feasible to have yet another law specifically concerning genetic information. 
The more realistic approach would be to seek protection of DTC-GT 
consumers’ genetic privacy as a part of a more comprehensive privacy law. 
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One potential avenue is through modification of HIPAA. Since its 
enactment in 1996, HIPAA has gone through one major modification—the 
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health 
(HITECH) Act in 2009.290 On December 14, 2018, the HHS Office for Civil 
Rights (OCR) issued a Request for Information (RFI) seeking public input 
to make modifications to the HIPAA Privacy Rule.291 Although the solicited 
comments are largely focused on promoting coordination of care,292 it is 
possible that the next phase of modification of HIPAA could involve 
addressing the issue of the continued increase of non-HIPAA medical 
information including genetic information from DTC-GT. However, such 
modification would alter the nature of HIPAA and raise the line-drawing 
question of how much non-HIPAA information the modified HIPAA should 
cover. 
The best solution to protect DTC-GT consumers’ genetic privacy would 
be a comprehensive data privacy law. While it once seemed to be a far-
fetched idea in the United States, a data privacy law might be more feasible 
than it used to be. Currently, there is mounting public pressure and political 
movement towards enacting a federal data privacy legislation.293 Among the 
bills introduced, the most notable is the draft Data Care Act of 2018 
introduced by Senator Brian Schatz (D-HI) and joined by fifteen other 
Democratic senators. 294  Upon scrutiny of the current text of the bill, 
however, it remains unclear whether the bill would be able to effectively 
regulate the data practices of DTC-GT companies. The draft Data Care Act 
imposes certain duties upon “online service providers” in terms of their data 
practices295 where an “online service provider” is defined as an entity that 
“is engaged in interstate commerce over the internet . . . and[,] in the course 
of business, collects individual identifying data about end users . . . .”296 
While DTC-GT companies could qualify as “online service providers” 
under this definition, the bill constrains “individual identifying data” to 
personal data that is “collected over the internet or any other digital 
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network . . . .”297 Thus, the genetic information provided by the DTC-GT 
companies to the consumers would not qualify as individual identifying data 
protected under this draft Data Care Act. Moreover, while the bill provides 
additional protection for “sensitive data,”298 examples of sensitive data do 
not explicitly include genetic information despite listing biometric data and 
health information.299 Meanwhile, EU’s GDPR explicitly includes genetic 
information as one category of personal information to be protected under 
the regulation.300 Moving forward, we encourage the legislative activities 
towards a comprehensive data privacy law to consider the widening 
landscape of personal information and explicitly include genetic 
information as a category of personal data to be protected thereby 
recognizing the importance of the consumers’ genetic privacy. 
CONCLUSION 
In The Right to Privacy, Warren and Brandeis identified two major 
threats to privacy: the press and technology.301 While much has changed 
since the days when Warren and Brandeis worried about the invasion of the 
press into the “sacred precincts of private and domestic life,”302 one thing 
appears to be in common. The threat of technology is worsening as a myriad 
of novel technologies and industries collect and use an ever-increasing 
amount of personal information. While DTC-GT services have 
revolutionized the way we acquire genetic information and enhanced 
consumer autonomy, it has also presented unforeseen privacy problems. In 
addition to heightened privacy risks due to the sensitivity of genetic 
information itself, DTC-GT poses special privacy harms in the form of 
knowledge harms, harms to autonomy and trust, and data misuse harms. 
When analyzed through an exploitation-based framework, the DTC-GT 
companies’ privacy policies and data practices do not adequately protect the 
consumers’ genetic privacy from these harms. The unfairness of these 
transactions justifies a change in the already inadequate regulatory 
landscape surrounding the DTC-GT industry. While improving external 
regulation, in the form of laws and agencies, can protect the consumers’ 
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genetic privacy to a certain degree, DTC-GT companies should also 
reconsider their entire approach to data privacy. When companies consider 
themselves as data stewards (or trustees) rather than owners of the 
consumers’ genetic information,303 we, as a society, would be able to bridge 
the trust-gap between DTC-GT services and consumers and further realize 
the potential of innovative technology and data.  
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